The next step of the trial court’s analysis concerns whether the admissible evidence establishes juror misconduct. When you start a riverside business then consult with Riverside business lawyers.
Juror misconduct can include consideration of matters outside the record, obtaining information from outside sources, quotient or compromised verdicts, consideration of the effect of attorneys’ fees as well as concealed bias. As the analysis for bias differs from other forms of juror misconduct, bias is discussed separately.
Establishing concealed bias
The California Supreme Court has made clear that where it appears substantially likely that a juror was actually biased, a new trial must be ordered, even if the court believes that the same verdict would have been reached by an unbiased jury. In this regard, the Court explained that whether or not the bias of a juror was prejudicial concerns an analysis less tolerant than a harmless-error analysis, because “if it appears substantially likely that a juror is actually biased, we must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased jury would have reached the same verdict. A biased adjudicator is one of the few “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”
A juror’s prejudgment of the case before deliberations may reveal juror bias. (See Grobeson, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 784 new trial warranted where juror stated prior to deliberations “made up my mind already. I’m not going to listen to the rest of this stupid argument”; Andrews, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 957-958 [juror’s statement that “this whole thing is a big farce,” constituted powerful evidence that the juror had prejudiced the case and/or concealed bias on voir dire warranting new trial]; Deward, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at pp. 443-444 juror’s mid-trial statement, “I don’t see why they don’t open up the jury room now. We could bring in a verdict already” was conclusive evidence, in the absence of any counter-affidavits, that the juror engaged in serious misconduct by prejudging the case.
Further, the act of communicating matters outside the record during deliberations may itself evidence actual bias because it is evidence that the juror intended the extraneous information to influence the verdict. See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657 communicating matters outside the record is itself evidence of actual bias, for it is evidence that the juror “intended the forbidden information to influence the verdict” and strengthens the likelihood of actual bias. Thus, where a juror communicates information obtained from outside sources or communicates special personal knowledge outside the record during deliberations, such evidence may demon-strate actual bias.
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